Civil Code and Related Subjects: Conflict of Laws by Dainow, Joseph
Louisiana Law Review
Volume 18 | Number 1
The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the
1956-1957 Term
December 1957
Civil Code and Related Subjects: Conflict of Laws
Joseph Dainow
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu.
Repository Citation
Joseph Dainow, Civil Code and Related Subjects: Conflict of Laws, 18 La. L. Rev. (1957)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol18/iss1/23
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
CONFLICT OF LAWS
Joseph Dainow*
The case of Brinson v. Brinson1 involves a situation in which
the decedent had his fling, and in which the property problem
he left for his survivors is greatly surpassed by the legal prob-
lems he left for the courts and the dialecticians. Evidently Willie
Brinson (deceased) believed in marriage but not much in di-
vorce. While still married to Annie, he married Zeola although
he was later divorced from Annie. Then he married Effie and
lived with her in Louisiana while he also continued to live with
Zeola. in Mississippi. If he had not left a little property at his
death, this fascinating story with numerous legal problems
would probably have not come to light. If Willie can look up,
or down, from where he is, he may be even more amused by the
ensuing disconcerted dissension among the law-men than he
was in establishing the original facts. The present discussion is
limited to the conflict of laws aspect of the case.
Accepting the proper eventual dissolution of Willie's first
marriage to Annie, and the invalidity of his ceremonial mar-
riage to Zeola, the single basic question in conflict of laws is
whether the Louisiana court should recognize Willie's continued
living (after divorce from Annie) as husband and wife with
Zeola as a common-law marriage under the laws of Mississippi.
The trial judge and the court of appeal held in the affirmative;
the Supreme Court reversed.
Two points emerge for special attention: one is the Louisiana
rule of conflict of laws and the method for determining the
validity of a marriage in choice-of-law cases; the other is the
meaning and use of "public policy" in conflicts cases.
In the United States, the general conflicts rule is that the
validity of a marriage is determined in accordance with the law
of the place where it was contracted and celebrated. 2 This rule
prevails in Louisiana3 and is apparently accepted by all the
courts which dealt with this case. Likewise, the facts are un-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 96 So.2d 653 (La. 1957), reversing 84 So.2d 888 (La. App. 1956).
2. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121 (1934); GOODRICH, HANDBOOK OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 351 (3d ed. 1949) ; STUMBERG, PRINCPLES OF CONFICT OF
LAWS 281 (2d ed. 1951).
3. See RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 121, Louisiana Annotations (1934).
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controverted that after the divorce from Annie, Willie continued
to live with Zeola in Mississippi as husband and wife. In Mis-
sissippi law, the so-called common-law marriage is valid. There
is some difference of opinion among the Louisiana judges as
to interpretation of Mississippi law concerning the effect of
good faith or bad faith on the part of the individuals, and there
was also difference in their findings as to the fact of good faith
or bad faith. These issues are not very important in the present
discussion because the Supreme Court's final opinion on re-
hearing assumed arguendo that in Mississippi Willie and Zeola
would be considered as husband and wife under a common-law
marriage. 4 The opinion goes on to discuss the "public policy"
point, but two paragraphs later there is a negation of this con-
cession by referring to "the mere continuation of the meretri-
cious relationship." Despite the assumption arguendo that it
was a good marriage in Mississippi, something in the factual
situation still rankled the court.
The main issue, and the one apparently intended to be the
ratio decidendi is the public policy point. In the logical applica-
tion of the forum's rule of conflict of laws, a court may normally
be referred to a foreign law for the determination of the ques-
tion at issue. If the logical conclusion of this process would
produce a result that is repugnant to the fundamental patterns
of local society, the court may preclude the operation of the
foreign rule on the ground that the result would be contrary to
the "public policy" of the forum.8
In the present case, this was taken to mean that the recogni-
tion of the factual situation as a marriage would be against the
public policy of Louisiana. The correct issue should have been
whether the Mississippi common-law marriage is repugnant to
Louisiana public policy. Yet that is not the case because both
the court of appeal7 and the Supreme Court 8 assert that Louisi-
ana courts have, in the application of the conflicts rule of lex loci.
celebrationis, recognized common-law marriages. Here, the court
took the issue as whether this particular Mississippi marriage
4. 96 So.2d 653, 660 (La. 1957).
5. Ibid.
6. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 612 (1934) ; GOODRIcH, HANDBOOK OF
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 21, 273, 369 (3d ed. 1949) ; STUMBERO, PRINCIPLES or
CONFLICT OF LAWS 168, 198, 278 (2d ed. 1951). See also Dainow, Policy Prob-
lems in Conflict Cases, 35 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1957) ; Paulsen, Public Policy ilk
the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 969 (1956).
7. 84 So.2d 888, 893 (La. App. 1956).
8. 96 So.2d 653, 656 (La. 1957).
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was repugnant. Again, it appears that something in the facts
of this case must have rankled the majority of the court.
The original opinion of the Supreme Court was likewise based
upon the public policy argument. It must, of course, be under-
stood that there is no purpose in using public policy as a bar
against an undesired result unless that result would otherwise
emerge from the logical application of regular rules in the nor-
mal process. Thus, the marriage, although valid in Mississippi,
would not be recognized and could have no legal effect in Lou-
isiana (i.e., no legal effect in Louisiana to a valid Mississippi
marriage). Accordingly, there is a switching of ideas in mid-
stream when the opinion concludes that "claiming the civil ef-
fects of a bigamous union, it would be inimical to public policy."9
(Emphasis added.) Differing from the lower courts, the Su-
preme Court found that Zeola was in bad faith, and that fact
seems to have pressed them in their thinking. If they had con-
cluded - rightly or wrongly - that under Mississippi law the
bad faith prevented a valid common-law marriage, the method
-of dealing with a choice-of-law case would have been correct and
consistent. But where the union is conceded to be a valid mar-
riage under Mississippi law, and it is affirmed that Louisiana
does recognize common-law marriages duly contracted in other
states, there is an erroneous juxtaposition of ideas when the
element of bad faith is used as a criterion to treat this par-
ticular marriage as repugnant to Louisiana public policy.
In the light of all the circumstances it might well appear to
fair and reasonable arbiters that Effie deserved the greatest con-
,sideration in the property where she and Willie had lived to-
gether. Some people might well say that "law must be tempered
with justice." Others might just as well add that when "justice
tampers with law" too much, it destroys the legal system as
such; it is recognized that the best of laws may sometimes work
harshly, but all situations call for clear and accurate analysis.
9. Id. at 659.
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